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THOMAS MORE LAW CENTER
24 Frank Lloyd Wright Drive · P.O. Box 393 · Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
Tel: (734) 827-2001 · Fax: (734) 930-7160

May 23, 2011
Clerk of the Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
100 East Fifth Street, Room 540
Potter Stewart U.S. Courthouse
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202-3988
Re:

Thomas More Law Center, et al. v. Barack Hussein Obama, et al.,
Sixth Circuit Case No. 10-2388

Dear Clerk:
Pursuant to this court’s letter of May 12, 2011, Plaintiffs/Appellants (“Plaintiffs”) respond to
the court’s questions as follows:
1. Standing/Ripeness.
Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“Act”), which became federal law on March 23, 2010. More specifically, Plaintiffs challenge
the provision of the Act that requires all private citizens, including Plaintiffs, to purchase
“minimum essential” healthcare coverage under penalty of federal law (hereinafter “Individual
Mandate”). Plaintiffs have alleged an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing and to invoke
this court’s jurisdiction under Article III and the Declaratory Judgment Act. And Plaintiffs’
challenge, which presents a purely legal question, is ripe for review even though the penalty
provision of the Individual Mandate does not take effect until 2014.
Article III of the Constitution confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual “cases” or
“controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. In an effort to give meaning to Article III’s
requirement, the courts have developed several “justiciability doctrines,” including “standing”
and “ripeness.” Nat’l Rifle Assoc. of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 279-80 (6th Cir. 1997).
Standing focuses on who may bring the action, and ripeness is concerned with when an action
may be brought. See id. at 280. The existence of an “actual controversy” in a constitutional
sense is necessary to sustain jurisdiction in this court. As stated by the Supreme Court:
A justiciable controversy is . . . distinguished from a difference or dispute of a
hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot. The
controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. It must be a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. Where there is such a concrete case admitting of an
immediate and definitive determination of the legal rights of the parties in an
adversary proceeding upon the facts alleged, the judicial function may be
appropriately exercised . . . .
1
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Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). Here, there is nothing “hypothetical,” “abstract,” “academic,” or “moot” about the
constitutional claims advanced. This case presents “a real and substantial controversy” between
parties with “adverse legal interests,” and this controversy can be resolved “through a decree of a
conclusive character.” Id. It will not require the court to render “an opinion advising what the
law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.” Id. In sum, it presents a “justiciable
controversy” in which “the judicial function may be appropriately exercised.” Id.
a. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Challenge the Act.
“In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide
the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). To
invoke the jurisdiction of this court, “[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to
the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). For a plaintiff to have standing to seek declaratory
and injunctive relief he “must show actual present harm or a significant possibility of future
harm. . . .” Nat’l Rifle Assoc. of Am., 132 F.3d at 279 (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiffs have
standing because they can demonstrate both present harm and a significant possibility of future
harm that are unquestionably traced to the challenged Act and can be redressed by the requested
relief.1 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) (finding it sufficient that at least one
plaintiff had standing). While the necessary injury-in-fact to confer standing is not susceptible to
precise definition, it must be “distinct and palpable,” Warth, 422 U.S. at 501, and not merely
“abstract,” “conjectural,” or “hypothetical,” Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; cf. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 101-02, 104 (1983); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109 (1969). Put another way,
the injury must be both “concrete and particularized,” meaning “that the injury must affect the
plaintiff in a personal and individual way,” as in this case. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (emphasis added).
The courts have recognized that “[a]n economic injury which is traceable to the challenged
action satisfies the requirements of Article III.” Linton v. Comm’r of Health & Env’t, 973 F.2d
1311, 1316 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997) (holding
that consumers who suffer economic injury from a regulation prohibited under the Commerce
Clause satisfy the standing requirement); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 154 (1967)
(stating that there was “no question in the present case that petitioners have sufficient standing”
to challenge a regulation that would require “changes in their everyday business practices”);
Nat’l Rifle Assoc. of Am., 132 F.3d at 281-84 (finding standing for the plaintiffs who alleged that
the passage of the challenged regulation impacted the way they conducted their daily business
1

As an employer, the Thomas More Law Center (“TMLC”) is subject to the provisions of the Act such
that it has standing to sue. TMLC also has associational standing because (1) its members, which include
Plaintiffs, have standing in their own right to sue, (2) the ultimate interest TMLC seeks to protect is the
constitutional rights of its members, which is germane to its purpose, and (3) neither the claim asserted
nor the relief requested requires participation of individual members because this action seeks only
declaratory and injunctive relief. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343
(1977); see also Cmtys. Against Runway Expansion, Inc. v. FAA, 355 F.3d 678, 684-85 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(finding that an organization had standing to sue where members would be exposed to increased noise as
a result of the FAA’s order approving a construction project).

2
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and that compliance would cause them economic harm); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 184 (2000) (acknowledging that regulations injuring a
plaintiff’s “economic interests” create the necessary injury-in-fact to confer standing). The
courts have also recognized that an official government act that causes a plaintiff to change his
behavior creates an injury sufficient to confer standing. See Hawley v. City of Cleveland, 773
F.2d 736 (6th Cir. 1985); Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003). Moreover,
“courts have routinely found sufficient adversity between the parties to create a justiciable
controversy when suit is brought by the particular plaintiff subject to the regulatory burden
imposed by a statute,” as in this case. See Nat’l Rifle Assoc. of Am., 132 F.3d at 282; Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. City of Cincinnati, 822 F.2d 1390,
1394-95 (6th Cir. 1987).
Here, Plaintiffs allege a personal injury—they are subject to regulation by an unconstitutional
statute that is causing present economic injury and a change in behavior with a “significant
possibility” of future harm—that is unquestionably traceable to the passage of the Act and likely
to be redressed by the relief requested in this lawsuit (declaratory and injunctive relief).2 And
short of judicial relief or Congress repealing the Act—the latter option being “most unlikely”—
the Individual Mandate and its penalty provisions hang over Plaintiffs’ heads “like the sword
over Damocles, creating a ‘here-and-now subservience.’” See, e.g., Metro. Wash. Airports Auth.
v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noises, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 265 n.13 (1991). Indeed, the
inevitable action causing harm—the passage of the Act—has arrived.3 See Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580 (1985).
On March 23, 2010, the Act was signed into law by the President. The Act regulates all
American citizens, including Plaintiffs, in an individual and personal way, with few
exceptions—and it regulates them now by coercing behavior and compliance. The Individual
Mandate is federal law—there is no condition precedent necessary, nor is there any subsequent
regulation required to make it so. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407,
418 (1942) (noting that a regulation “sets a standard of conduct for all to whom its terms apply,
[and i]t operates as such in advance of the imposition of sanctions upon any particular
individual”). Because the penalty applies in the future does not alter the fact that Plaintiffs must
now consider, plan for, and take actions to fulfill their “shared responsibility” as mandated by the
Act. Those who do not have the “minimum essential coverage” are considered “irresponsible”
citizens, who can avoid the present social opprobrium and the financial penalty in 2014 only so
long as they change their behavior and comply with the Act. In sum, Plaintiffs are compelled
2

An individual who is forced by the challenged regulation to arrange his private affairs to ensure that he
has sufficient finances to pay for private healthcare coverage that meets the requirements of the Act—or
change jobs to one that provides such healthcare coverage—has sustained “a concrete economic injury”
that is directly (not just “fairly”) traceable to the Act. (R-28: Order at 5-8). In fact, even if Plaintiffs
obtained healthcare coverage in the intervening period of time, they will still be subject to the Act, which
mandates “minimum essential coverage” and requires that this coverage be indefinitely maintained under
penalty of law.
3
The Act has a reporting requirement enabling the government to keep a record of the offenders. See 26
U.S.C. § 6055. Indeed, employers, including TMLC, are required to report the value of employerprovided coverage on each employee’s W-2 form. See 26 U.S.C. § 6051. As a result, government record
keeping is beginning immediately.

3
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now to incur costs and burdens in order to comply with this federal law—costs and burdens that
they would otherwise not incur. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (“The
threat of sanctions may deter . . . almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions.”).
And it is inevitable that they will be regulated by the Individual Mandate in the future. Plaintiffs
need not wait for the imposition of a penalty to seek relief from this court. Thomas, 473 U.S. at
581 (“One does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive
relief.”); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925). As the district court concluded
below:
Plaintiffs’ decisions to forego certain spending today, so they will have the funds
to pay for health insurance when the Individual Mandate takes effect in 2014, are
injuries fairly traceable to the Act for the purposes of conferring standing. There
is nothing improbable about the contention that the Individual Mandate is causing
plaintiffs to feel economic pressure today. . . . . In fact, the proposition that the
Individual Mandate leads uninsured individuals to feel pressure to start saving
money today to pay more than $8,000 for insurance, per year, starting in 2014, is
entirely reasonable. . . . Parents wishing to send their child to college often start
saving money for that purpose as soon as the child is born, even though the
expense will not be incurred for eighteen years. And while such parents may be
diligent in their saving, making many sacrifices along the way, their child might
earn a scholarship to college, or decide to forego higher education, thus rendering
the parents’ sacrifices unnecessary. Such outcomes, however, do not diminish the
real financial burden felt by the parents in earlier years. . . . This court finds that
the injury-in-fact in this case is the present financial pressure experienced by
plaintiffs due to the requirements of the Individual Mandate. [Consequently,] the
individual named plaintiffs do have standing to bring their constitutional
challenge to the Individual Mandate provision of the Health Care Reform Act and
TMLC has standing to advance its challenge on behalf of its members.
(R-28: Order at 7-8).
Indeed, in Village of Bensenville v. FAA, 376 F.3d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2004), the court held that
the plaintiffs had standing to challenge a fee that would not go into effect for 13 years. The court
stated, “The FAA’s order is final and, absent action by us, come 2017 Chicago will begin
collecting the passenger facility fee; accordingly, the impending threat of injury to the
municipalities is sufficiently real to constitute injury-in-fact and afford constitutional standing.”
Id. at 1119 (internal quotations and punctuation omitted). The same is true here.
In sum, Plaintiffs have standing because they have alleged a “personal injury” that is “fairly
traceable” to the Act and is “likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” See Allen, 468 U.S.
at 751.
b. Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Claims Are Also Ripe for Review.
The basic rationale of the ripeness doctrine “is to prevent the courts, through premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.” Thomas, 473 U.S. at 580
(quoting Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 148). “The problem is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring
[the courts] to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the
4
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parties of withholding court consideration.” Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149. This Circuit weighs
several factors to determine whether the issues presented are ripe for review, including, (1) “the
hardship to the parties if judicial relief is denied”; (2) “the likelihood that the harm alleged by
plaintiffs will ever come to pass”; and (3) “whether the case is fit for judicial resolution,” which
requires “a determination of whether the factual record is sufficiently developed to produce a fair
adjudication of the merits of the parties’ respective claims.” Nat’l Rifle Assoc. of Am., 132 F.3d
at 284 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
(1) There Is Hardship to the Parties if Judicial Review Is Denied.
The hardship factor weighs in favor of finding the case ripe for review. In fact, it is also in
the government’s interest to know sooner, rather than later, whether the “essential part” of its
multi-billion (if not trillion) dollar program regulating the national healthcare market is
constitutional, particularly in light of the fact that the program is going to cost taxpayers an
additional $115 billion to simply implement. (See R-18; CBO Ltr. at Ex. 2). “To require the
[healthcare] industry[, the federal government, every State, and every American citizen] to
proceed without knowing whether the [Individual Mandate] is valid would impose a palpable
and considerable hardship.” See Thomas, 473 U.S. 581. And as demonstrated previously, the
Individual Mandate is causing a present economic injury to Plaintiffs in order to comply with the
government’s unconstitutional demand. See Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152-53; Nat’l Rifle Assoc.
of Am., 132 F.3d at 284; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 710 F.2d
1165, 1172 (6th Cir. 1983) (requiring a company to wait to challenge proposed changes in the
testing of cigarettes constituted hardship); see also Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 316 U.S. at 41719 (finding challenge ripe prior to the imposition of sanctions and noting that when regulations
are promulgated “and the expected conformity to them causes injury cognizable by a court of
equity, they are appropriately the subject of attack”). Indeed, the enforcement of the
unconstitutional Individual Mandate is inevitable, if not presently effective in fact. See Lake
Carriers’ Ass’n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972). Thus, there are no advantages to the parties
or this court to be gained from withholding judicial review.
(2) The Alleged Harm Is Inevitable.
As the Supreme Court stated in Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143
(1942), “Where the inevitability of the operation of a statute against certain individuals is patent,
it is irrelevant to the existence of a justiciable controversy that there will be a time delay before
the disputed provision will come into effect.” And in this Circuit, “inevitability” is not required;
rather, the court has held that a claim is ripe when it is “highly probable” that the alleged harm or
injury will occur. Kardules v. City of Columbus, 95 F.3d 1335, 1344 (6th Cir. 1996). Here, the
imposition of the Individual Mandate is “highly probable,” if not “inevitable.” The same is true
of the penalty provision, which operates automatically against anyone who does not comply with
the mandate. This court can make a firm prediction that the challenged mandate to purchase and
maintain “minimum essential” coverage under penalty of law will apply to Plaintiffs.

5
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(3) The Case Is Fit for Judicial Resolution.
“In considering the fitness of an issue for judicial review, the court must ensure that a record
adequate to support an informed decision exists when the case is heard.” Nat’l Rifle Assoc. of
Am., 132 F.3d at 290. A case that presents a purely legal issue, such as the challenge at issue
here, is unquestionably a case fit for judicial resolution. See Thomas, 473 U.S. at 581 (holding
challenge ripe where the issue presented was “purely legal, and will not be clarified by further
factual development”); Abbot Labs., 387 U.S. at 149 (same); Nat’l Rifle Assoc. of Am., 132 F.3d
at 290-91 (same); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1171 (same); Pic-A-State
PA, Inc. v. Reno, 76 F.3d 1294 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding Commerce Clause challenge ripe for
review because it presented a purely legal issue); Village of Bensenville, 376 F.3d at 1120 (“The
FAA’s decision[, which imposes a fee that would not go into effect for 13 years,] is plainly ‘fit’
for our consideration now as the municipalities challenge a final FAA order on purely legal
grounds.”).
In sum, Plaintiffs have standing, and their constitutional challenge is ripe for review.4
Penalty Enforcement Mechanisms Available to the IRS.
In conjunction with its standing/ripeness inquiry, this court asked, “If the plaintiffs do not
purchase minimum essential coverage and do not pay the penalty, what available enforcement
mechanisms are available to the IRS?” and “What role, if any, do IRS enforcement mechanisms
play in the injury and hardship requirements?”
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs, as law-abiding citizens, will choose compliance with the law,
which requires them to purchase minimum essential healthcare coverage, over disobedience. (R18: DeMars Suppl. Decl. at ¶¶ 2-8 at Ex. 1). Indeed, even without the imposition of a penalty,
the Act currently “sets a standard of conduct for all to whom its terms apply,” and thus it
“operates as such in advance of the imposition of sanctions upon any particular individual.”
4

Courts have also identified a number of other, and in some respects related, factors that demonstrate the
ripeness of Plaintiffs’ claims. For example, courts find ripeness where the plaintiff’s contemplated course
of action falls within the scope of a statute and the statute affects the plaintiff’s current actions. See
Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 501 U.S. at 265 n.13; Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383,
393 (1988); Zielasko v. State of Ohio, 873 F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1989). Another reason courts entertain preenforcement challenges is fundamental fairness—the notion that a plaintiff should not be forced to choose
between compliance with a statute and the legal penalties. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974)
(holding challenge ripe given that a contrary finding “may place the hapless plaintiff between the Scylla
of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of forgoing what he believes to be constitutionally
protected activity”); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992) (holding challenge
ripe where respondents were “faced with a Hobson’s choice” of compliance or penalty); Navegar, Inc. v.
United States, 103 F.3d 994, 998-99 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding challenge ripe because a threat of
prosecution can put the threatened party “between a rock and a hard place”). Some courts, including this
one, have also recognized that allowing such pre-enforcement challenges promotes the rule of law.
Peoples Rights Org., Inc. v. City of Columbus, 152 F.3d 522, 530 (6th Cir. 1998) (“We believe a citizen
should be allowed to prefer ‘official adjudication to public disobedience.’”); Bland v. Fessler, 88 F.3d
729, 737 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that the decision to obey the law and bring a declaratory action
“demonstrates a commendable respect for the rule of law”).

6
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Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 316 U.S. at 418. Consequently, Plaintiffs have standing to make this
ripe challenge to the Act with or without the actual enforcement of the penalty. Nevertheless,
under the current statutory regime, the Individual Mandate may be enforced by three distinct
mechanisms: (1) tax refund offset; (2) automatic tax lien foreclosure; and (3) reprioritization of
tax payments. See Daniel L. Mellor, The Individual Mandate Tax: Healthcare’s Toothless
Watchdog, Tax Notes, Jan. 3, 2011, at 109-11 (discussing the possible enforcement
mechanisms).5
Background.
The Individual Mandate penalty is payable on notice and demand of the Treasury Secretary,
26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g)(1), and automatically attaches to Plaintiffs’ property, 26 U.S.C. § 6321.
However, a failure to pay may not result in a criminal prosecution or the filing of a tax lien. 26
U.S.C. §§ 5000(g)(2)(A) & (B). The proscription in the Act against the filing of a tax lien
precludes the IRS from collecting against, or asserting a priority over, a tax payer’s creditors or
transferees. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6323 (a) & (f). Notwithstanding these limitations, the IRS has the
authority to assess interest and other penalties on any unpaid amounts, 26 U.S.C. §§ 6601 &
6672(a), and will have other quite effective means to collect the penalty from Plaintiffs as set
forth below.
(1) Tax Refund Offset.
The IRS has the statutory authority to offset all tax liabilities, including accrued interest and
penalties, against refunds otherwise due in a current year. 18 U.S.C. § 2602(a). Approximately
65% of the taxpayers in the United States receive a refund. Consequently, “IRS Commissioner
Douglas Shulman believes that this ability to reduce or confiscate tax refunds will be sufficient
to enforce compliance.” Mellor, supra, at 110.
(2) Automatic Tax Lien Foreclosure.
A second method for collecting the unpaid Individual Mandate penalty employs an automatic
tax lien and judicial foreclosure suit. 26 U.S.C. § 7403. Thus, while § 5000A(g) prohibits the
filing of a notice of lien, the lien itself arises automatically if the tax is unpaid after notice and
demand. I.R.S. Pub. 1468 at 3. The lien is perpetual and may attach to all property owned or
subsequently acquired by the taxpayer. Once the lien automatically attaches, the IRS may levy
against it by seizing the property or suing to foreclose the lien, depending upon the type of
property at issue. 26 U.S.C. § 7403.
(3) Reprioritize Tax Payments.
Yet a third approach to collecting any unpaid Individual Mandate penalties might include a
regulatory ruling to reprioritize Plaintiffs’ tax payments. This approach is explained as follows:
There is a third approach—neither allowed nor prohibited under the code—that
may actually be the most appropriate and effective method. The Service could
5

To further assist this court, a copy of this article is attached.
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simply establish a superpriority for the IMT [Individual Mandate penalty] in
applying tax payments. Thus, for example, the first dollar of tax withheld from an
individual’s paycheck, or remitted in estimated payments, would go toward
paying the IMT, and if there were any deficiency, it would be considered an
income tax deficiency, which could then be assessed and collected by the usual
methods.
This approach is currently not used by the Service. In the case of underpayments,
the IRS will apply the payment first to tax, then to penalty, then to interest owed.
However, its use in the collection of IMT would do much to mitigate the
collection problems created by the restrictions in section 5000A(g).
First, it would restore to the IRS all of the force and effect of subtitle F. Second,
it would cut down on the delay in collecting the tax because once the IMT
determination is made through the matching program, the amount would be
collected immediately from future paychecks. The resort to judicial process
would be mostly eliminated. Third, unlike a refund offset, which will probably
not be sufficient to cover the IMT, the average income tax liability is $10,406.
This amount would more than satisfy any outstanding IMT. Fourth, the IMT
would then share in all the economic and logistical advantages of source payment,
that is, employer withholding.
Also, there is little a taxpayer could do to frustrate that maneuver. No rational
individual would seek to earn less income merely to prevent the IRS from being
able to recover a full IMT payment. Employer withholding is automatic. Even if
taxpayers reduced the amount withheld from their paychecks, it would still likely
be sufficient to offset the IMT. This approach would also be effective against
those most likely to incur IMT, that is, lower-income taxpayers who are ineligible
for Medicaid, because they are mostly working individuals. Even if they
ultimately have no tax liability, tax will still be withheld from their paychecks.
The economic incentives and disincentives created by reprioritization are minimal
because they are subsumed in the already existing incentives of the income tax
withholding system.
Mellor, supra, at 111 (citations omitted).
As is clear from the statutory and regulatory regimes available to the IRS set out above,
Plaintiffs are subject to an array of enforcements mechanisms beyond Plaintiffs’ civic
responsibility to be participating and law abiding citizens.
2. Facial/As-applied.
Plaintiffs challenge the authority of Congress to enact the Individual Mandate provision of
the Act. Certainly, as the standing argument above illustrates, Plaintiffs challenge Congress’
authority to force them—private citizens who are not by any measure engaged in any relevant
commerce—to purchase minimum essential healthcare coverage as a matter of federal law.
8
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Consequently, this case could properly be viewed as an “as-applied” challenge. However, by
their very nature, almost all challenges to the specific exercise of an enumerated power, such as
the Commerce Clause, are facial challenges. Thus, if Congress lacked the authority to enact
certain legislation, such as the Individual Mandate, that legislation adversely affects everyone in
every application. In light of this reality, it does not appear that the “no set of circumstances”
language of United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), has any practical impact on the
resolution of this case. As the Court stated in City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22
(1999), “To the extent we have consistently articulated a clear standard for facial challenges, it is
not the Salerno formulation, which has never been the decisive factor in any decision of this
Court, including Salerno itself.”
In United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), the Court stated,
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. The fact that the [Act]
might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is
insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an
“overbreadth” doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment.
As Salerno itself suggests, if Congress lacked enumerated authority to pass legislation at its
inception, as in this case, then there would be “no set of circumstances . . . under which the Act
would be valid.” Thus, there would be no “conceivable set of circumstances” under which the
Act could be enforced because there was no authority to enact the legislation in the first
instance—the law is “legally stillborn.” See Commonwealth of Va. v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d
768, 773-74 (E.D. Va. 2010).
Indeed, the Court did not cite Salerno, let alone apply it, in either United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995), or United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), cases in which the Court
held that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority by enacting certain legislation. Nor
did the Court cite to Salerno in the more recent Commerce Clause case of Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1 (2005).
In sum, whether this court construes the present challenge to be “facial” or “as-applied” is of
little moment. This case presents a purely legal question addressing Congress’ authority to enact
the challenged legislation (i.e., Individual Mandate) at its inception. Consequently, Salerno has
no legal—nor practical—application.

9
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Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
THOMAS MORE LAW CENTER
/s/ Robert J. Muise
Robert J. Muise, Esq.
LAW OFFICES OF DAVID YERUSHALMI, P.C.
/s/ David Yerushalmi
David Yerushalmi, Esq.
Enclosure:

Daniel L. Mellor, The Individual Mandate Tax: Healthcare’s Toothless
Watchdog, Tax Notes, Jan. 3, 2011

cc w/enclosure: Opposing Counsel (via ECF)
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